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Abstract
The increasing levels of criminal media being shared in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks pose a significant challenge to
law enforcement agencies. One of the main priorities for P2P investigators is to identify cases where a user is actively
engaged in the production of child sexual abuse (CSA) media – they can be indicators of recent or on-going child
abuse. Although a number of P2P monitoring tools exist to detect paedophile activity in such networks, they typically
rely on hash value databases of known CSA media. As a result, these tools are not able to adequately triage the
thousands of results they retrieve, nor can they identify new child abuse media that are being released on to a network.
In this paper, we present a new intelligent forensics approach that incorporates the advantages of artificial intelligence
and machine learning theory to automatically flag new/previously unseen CSA media to investigators. Additionally,
the research was extensively discussed with law enforcement cybercrime specialists from different European countries
and Interpol. The approach has been implemented into the iCOP toolkit, a software package that is designed to
perform live forensic analysis on a P2P network environment. In addition, the system offers secondary features, such
as showing on-line sharers of known CSA files and the ability to see other files shared by the same GUID or other IP
addresses used by the same P2P client. Finally, our evaluation on real CSA case data shows high degrees of accuracy,
while hands-on trials with law enforcement officers demonstrate the toolkit’s complementarity to extant investigative
workflows.
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1. Introduction
The proliferation of the Internet and peer-to-peer
(P2P) file sharing systems has transformed the distri-
bution of child sexual abuse media (CSA) into a crime
without geographical boundaries. While there is sci-
entific debate [1] on whether the on-line child sex of-
fender is a new type of offender [2] or if those with a
pre-disposition to offend are responding to the opportu-
nities afforded by the new forms of social media [3],
empirical evidence points to the problem of Internet-
based paedophilia as endemic. The scale of CSA media
trafficking in P2P networks has been investigated by a
number of studies involving a timespan of several days
(e.g. [4, 5]), weeks (e.g. [6]), months (e.g. [7, 8, 9, 10])
or even an entire year ([11]). They all showed that,
worldwide, hundreds of searches for child abuse images
occur each second, resulting in hundreds of thousands
of CSA media being shared each year. Moreover, [12]
found that 16% of CSA media possessors had commit-
ted one or more contact offences, i.e. they had directly
and physically abused children.
The severity of the problem has already resulted in
a number of solutions that can monitor such activity.
The Child Protection System (CPS) [13] and RoundUp
[14, 15]) are able to capture data about paedophile ac-
tivity and identify child abuse media across different
P2P protocols. However, these tools rely on match-
ing the files shared on a network against a hash-value
database of known CSA media1. As a result, they re-
trieve thousands of files that have been circulating for
several months or even years, but they are not able to
identify new child abuse media when they are being re-
leased on to the network. Nor are they able to detect
CSA media that are not on record, that have been al-
1Such databases are built through post-hoc forensic analysis of
seized computers of offenders.
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tered or embedded into other regular image or video
files. In the first part of this paper, we discuss in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with a key informant
sample of cybercrime investigators from different Eu-
ropean countries that highlight the fundamental need
for the development of new approaches that support
victim-centric investigative practices. More specifically,
we show that in P2P policing contexts, the distributors
of new/previously unknown CSA media are considered
high-risk targets, because they could be linked to recent
or even on-going child abuse.
To combat the current and future challenges of cyber-
crime, the authors of [16] already argued that there is a
need to re-examine standard digital forensic procedures
and the use of investigative technology by incorporating
intelligent technologies, i.e. techniques from artificial
intelligence, computational modelling and/or social net-
work analysis. In the second part of this paper, we show
that such intelligent techniques can be used to focus P2P
network investigations pertaining to child sexual abuse
and reduce the amount of time spent looking for digi-
tal evidence. More specifically, we present a novel ap-
proach that incorporates the advantages of artificial in-
telligence (AI) and machine learning procedures to au-
tomatically identify new/previously unseen CSA media
to investigators. The key contributions of our work are
as follows:
• We argue that detecting new/previously unknown
CSA media requires (semi-)automatic analysis of
image and video content. This study presents a
new image and video classification module using
multiple and – in case of video – multi-modal (vi-
sual and audio) feature descriptions, leading to a
robust and highly accurate identification of child
abuse content.
• Downloading of all candidate files in support of
the image and video analysis component we men-
tioned above is clearly infeasible in a P2P scenario.
Hence, such an approach also requires an interme-
diate step to reduce the number of candidate files
to be downloaded for image analysis. In this paper,
we present an intelligent solution to this challenge,
which adopts automatic text categorisation tech-
niques to determine the likelihood that a candidate
file contains CSA content based on its filename.
An evaluation on verified CSA media demonstrates
the efficiency of the approach when automatically
detecting potential candidates for new CSA media
out of thousands of non-CSA files that are contin-
uously being shared in P2P networks.
• We propose a triage approach to flag the most perti-
nent candidates for new/previously unknown child
abuse media based on a synthesis of the above two
modules.
• We describe the results of evaluating our approach
on real CSA filenames and features of CSA media,
which show high degrees of accuracy.
The approach has been implemented into the iCOP
toolkit, a software package that is designed to perform
live forensic analysis on a P2P network environment.
Finally, a user evaluation by law enforcement officers
highlights the iCOP toolkit’s potential to complement
and enhance extant investigative workflows pertaining
to CSA media.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the
next section, we provide an overview of the in-depth in-
terviews, together with the survey of law enforcement
user requirements. Next, we discuss background ma-
terial and related work in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5
describes the key components of our approach, that is,
the filename categorisation module and the media clas-
sification module. Our approach is evaluated on CSA
data in Section 6. Section 7 outlines the architecture of
the iCOP toolkit and discusses how the two analyses are
synthesised to perform live triage on P2P data and de-
tect new/previously unknown CSA media. In Section 8
we provide insights from our user trial. Finally, Section
9 concludes the paper, discusses the limitations of our
approach and identifies directions for future research.
2. Challenges for Live Forensic Analysis of P2P Net-
works
Notwithstanding increased investment in the devel-
opment of interventions to combat the exchange of CSA
media within P2P systems, significant challenges persist
for those charged with the policing of these crimes (e.g.
[17, 18]). In order to understand these constraints, and
to identify where capacity for technical solutions to in-
vestigative practitioners’ problems might exist, we com-
menced our study with a review. More specifically, our
primary objective was to extend the sparse and rather
limited knowledge base on the strategies employed by
law enforcement in the policing and interception of
CSA media exchanges in P2P networks, offence char-
acteristics, investigative objectives, and attendant chal-
lenges and requirements in investigative settings. Given
the dearth of empirical information in these domains, as
well as the inaccessibility of P2P policing and offend-
ing processes to the general public, it became evident
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that this analysis required extensive consultation with
specialist P2P investigators given their unique status as
“gatekeepers” to these hidden subcultures. Therefore,
we conducted both a series of in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with a key informant sample of law enforce-
ment investigators expert in the investigation of CSA
media exchanges on P2P networks and a broader, web-
based survey of domain investigators.
The consultations were carried out between October
2011 and January 2012. Survey and interview respon-
dents were sourced via two channels; (1) the iCOP re-
search teams contact network, as established in preced-
ing P2P-related research projects, and (2) the iCOP law
enforcement advisory group. In the first phase of the
consultation, twenty-four P2P investigators completed
a confidential on-line survey of law enforcement users.
Invitations to participate in the survey were issued via
email to P2P investigators from child abuse investiga-
tion and cybercrime investigation units. The survey
contained 21 questions related to the focus of P2P in-
vestigations, characteristics of CSA media file sharing
behaviour and the data sources employed in typical in-
vestigations. The majority of the survey questions were
multiple-choice, with the possibility to enter free-form
replies in response to four items. Law enforcement rep-
resentatives from twelve countries participated in the
survey, including Germany, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Slovenia, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Roma-
nia, France, Spain, New Zealand and Canada, as well as
experts from Interpol.
Upon completion of the survey, ten in-depth key in-
formant interviews were conducted with law enforce-
ment experts from four countries (Australia, Sweden,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The in-
terview and survey samples were developed indepen-
dently, albeit with some overlap between participants
(five investigators participated in both consultation ac-
tivities). The sample frame for the interviews comprised
leading law enforcement investigators with expertise in
the policing of CSA media offences on P2P. From this
sample frame, a number of prospective interviewees
were purposively sampled in accordance Tremblays cri-
teria for the selection of key informants [19]. Prospec-
tive interview candidates were first identified as estab-
lished authorities in P2P network investigation with ex-
tensive supporting expertise in the use of P2P monitor-
ing software – in so far as possible the research team
sought validation of this status and a personal recom-
mendation from a member of the iCOP law enforce-
ment advisory group. Once identified as key informants,
candidates were invited to participate in an interview.
The sample was stratified to ensure that an international
cross-section of practitioners from countries within and
outside of the EU were included in the research. Given
that the consultation process was limited to ten candi-
dates, quotas were applied (min. one, max. three candi-
dates per country) to ensure that a broad range of coun-
tries was represented in the interview process. Twelve
email requests for participation in the research were is-
sued to expert candidates. In all cases, this invitation
advised prospective participants of the aims and objec-
tives of the study and key data handling and security
provisions to be made by the research team. Of this
number, two candidates declined due to competing op-
erational commitments and ten accepted the invitation
to participate. The resulting interview transcripts were
analysed using combined Thematic Analysis [20] and
Correspondence Analysis [21] strategies. The follow-
ing findings synopsise the operational, legal and techni-
cal challenges to live forensic analysis of P2P networks
identified in these consultations.
A primary operational challenge identified by our re-
spondents was the actualisation of reliable strategies for
identifying child sexual abuse cases (and its offenders)
during live forensic analyses of P2P networks. While
investigative strategies such as victim identification (e.g.
[22]) maintain child protection and the primacy of the
child victim as a central operational concern, in many
cases the legal mandate to apprehend offenders has per-
sisted as a principal focus for law enforcement [24].
Our respondents’ descriptions of live investigations of
P2P networks reflected these conflicting imperatives –
their accounts were characterised by a tension between
the adoption of strategies that supported offender appre-
hension and those that prioritised the identification and
welfare of child victims. However, each P2P investiga-
tor in our interview sample clearly expressed locating
and safeguarding child victims as a fundamental inves-
tigative objective. In this regard, the identification of
victims and perpetrators of contact sexual offences was
cited by all respondents as the predominant concern for
law enforcement investigators, even superordinate to the
policing of CSA media offences:
“If we were to identify, or we believed an on-
line identity was committing the abuse of a
child, that would be priority number one. It
doesn’t matter if we think or we can show that
they have child pornography, that is all sec-
ondary, the reality is that child pornography
is secondary to an actual live victim.” (Aus-
tralian Police, Respondent 1).
“We need to keep pushing [investigators] to-
ward that person who is abusing children and
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not just the collector – as bad as that is as well
– you want to rescue children.” (UK Police,
Respondent 1).
Although our respondents’ operational motivations
and objectives were profoundly and formatively influ-
enced by this victim-centric ethos, several practical
challenges to the identification of victims of child sex-
ual abuse (and perpetrators) were reported. For exam-
ple, the investigators described a parallel legal mandate
to enforce the law with regard to broader offences of
possession and distribution of CSA media, in which
it was often impossible to establish a link between
these offences and the actual sexual abuse of a child.
Consequently, in some cases investigators stated to af-
ford primacy to legal rather than victim-centric imper-
atives, selecting a target for investigation on the ba-
sis of the duration of the sentence their CSA media-
related offending would incur (i.e. based on the num-
ber or type of files they made available for distribu-
tion), rather than to attempt to identify on-going sex-
ual abuse. Evidently, such approaches are inconsis-
tent with de facto, victim-centric policing strategies that
prioritise the identification and welfare of victims of
child sexual abuse. However, while state-of-the-art fea-
tures of P2P monitors support the apprehension of pro-
lific downloaders and distributors of CSA media, our
respondents reported that these could not be usefully
adapted to victim-centric investigations, because they
typically provide little data that readily supports alter-
native investigative actions, such as the identification of
victims of child sexual abuse in live forensic analysis
contexts. The level of automation currently afforded by
P2P monitoring solutions has entrenched this prevail-
ing emphasis on offender apprehension in the sense that
many investigators, operating in resource-constrained
investigative environments, have become reliant upon
automated approaches that support large-scale offence
detection. In these application scenarios, P2P investiga-
tors are required to expend little cognitive effort in the
identification of new cases. Rather, they may simply
select cases for follow-up from a series of offending tar-
gets identified by the monitor, a process a contributor
variously described as “shooting fish in a barrel” ((UK
Police, Respondent 2).
Clearly, in naturalistic decision making environments
such as those of P2P investigations, which are charac-
terised by time-constraints, high cognitive load and ex-
cessive case load, a scalable tool that automates the de-
tection of offending targets is an essential solution for
effective investigation. P2P investigators’ adaptation of
non-invasive monitoring tools to the identification of of-
fending targets is a beneficial and adaptive investigative
strategy that serves a particular value in these settings
by decreasing detectives’ cognitive load and increasing
their capacity to secure charges and convictions against
those culpable for significant dissemination of CSA me-
dia on P2P networks. However, this adaptation is not
without its flaws. While these monitors promote the
apprehension of great numbers of P2P offenders with
problematic distribution profiles, they do not reliably
aggregate offence data, prompt or otherwise enable in-
vestigators to develop criminal intelligence in a way that
supports the identification of victims of recent or on-
going sexual abuse.
Aside from the capacity limitations of P2P monitor-
ing tools in respect of victim identification and other
victim-centric endeavours, our respondents’ accounts
also foregrounded a series of disparities in the availabil-
ity of broader infrastructural supports that could sup-
port victim-centred investigations: (i) the limited avail-
ability of human resources, or skilled investigators with
requisite expertise in victim identification; (ii) the ab-
sence of access to technical infrastructures, such as na-
tional and international reference databases of CSA me-
dia that can serve (inter alia) as a point for referencing
seized imagery and identifying new victimisation; and
(iii) the rudimentary implementation of victim-centric,
investigative policies and practices. For example, in
some countries investigators reported to make system-
atic referrals of new images seized in P2P investiga-
tions to their national databases (and to Interpol’s In-
ternational Child Sexual Exploitation Database), while
in other countries similar victim-focused strategies were
not apparent. The latter finding highlights a core chal-
lenge to the identification of victims and perpetrators
of child sexual abuse in P2P investigations – the identi-
fication of new or previously unknown CSA media is a
fundamental pre-requisite of victim identification inves-
tigations insofar as these materials comprise the primary
evidential artefact upon which image analysis and other
victim identification strategies are enacted [23]. Hence,
a principal concern for each of our respondents was the
identification of any type of traded CSA media that sug-
gested the file was new, i.e. depicting new victimisation
or previously unknown to law enforcement, domestic
in origin, or that otherwise suggested some proximate
connection between the producers of the material and
distributors on a P2P network.
“Whilst it may not be at the bad end of the
scale, I would say that any material, if we
identify any material that was being traded
that was first-generation material – anything
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that’s been, you know, home movies – if
we believe it’s been taken by the sender that
would be prioritised. Because a first genera-
tion image is a clear indicator of abuse.” (Aus-
tralian Police, Respondent 1).
“If you run your database across a computer,
you are going to know that there is x amount
of hundred or thousand known images. The
ones that aren’t known are the ones that the
officers have to concentrate and look for.”
(UK Police, Respondent 1).
The identification of new CSA media was identified
over a decade ago as a central operational objective for
police and law enforcement concerned with the identi-
fication of victims of CSA media; one that was much
more difficult, more resource-intensive and much more
challenging to operationalise than more traditional in-
vestigative activities such as the disruption of CSA me-
dia distribution networks [24]. However, our respon-
dents reported that significant challenges persist in the
identification of new CSA media in P2P investigations.
Some 91% of our survey contributors indicated that they
maintained no (or very limited) capacity for the identi-
fication of new CSA media and its originators in P2P
environments and expressed strong support for the de-
velopment of such a functionality within live forensic
analysis contexts. Furthermore, they reported that the
significant requirement for manual analysis in the iden-
tification of new CSA media, coupled with the sheer
volume of CSA media exchanges on P2P, compounds
the challenge of enacting victim-centric investigations
in this policing domain. Also, law enforcement agen-
cies maintain little capacity to support large-scale down-
loading of candidate CSA media files in support of con-
tent analysis and verification tools.
The review we presented in this section highlights the
fundamental need for the development of approaches
that enable P2P investigators to identify and prioritise
cases where the target is engaged in the sexual abuse of
children and/or the production of CSA media. While
some preliminary attempts have been made to utilise
materials accessed by suspects to assist in prioritising
which investigations take place first (e.g. [25]), to this
day no framework exists that can reliably discriminate
high-risk targets in P2P policing contexts – such as
those distributing new/previously unknown CSA me-
dia that may indicate recent or on-going child abuse. It
should be noted, however, that law enforcement require-
ments for the development of victim-centric approaches
in P2P investigation are in some cases not simply met
by extending the functionalities of extant P2P monitor-
ing systems to the identification of new CSA media.
Law enforcement contributors in several jurisdictions
reported that they were unable to deploy non-invasive
P2P monitoring tools such as CPS in their P2P investi-
gations due to statutory proscriptions on the enactment
of pro-active surveillance strategies where, for example,
suspects may be subjected to continuous monitoring in
order to intercept a criminal offence. Yet, they were sim-
ilarly challenged by the problem of P2P offending and
by their inability to consistently identify new CSA me-
dia in these investigations.
3. Background
3.1. Digital Forensics
After seizing a suspect’s computer, police investiga-
tors typically create a forensic “image” by copying ei-
ther the entire disk or a subset from the data (e.g. a
disk partition) from the target device to a second hard
drive. In some cases, running computers are even un-
plugged to avoid changes made to the hard disk dur-
ing the shut-down process. This way, investigators are
able to analyse the computer’s content without tamper-
ing the original evidence. This type of criminal investi-
gation is usually referred to as traditional digital foren-
sics [26, 27, 28]. In live digital forensics, however, in-
vestigators interact with a running computer or system
in order to gather intelligence and, based on that intel-
ligence, they determine the following steps in the in-
vestigation [28]. Furthermore, digital forensics can be
applied both reactively – as an investigative act in an
on-going investigation, and pro-actively – before an in-
cident is officially reported to police investigators 2. For
the purpose of this study, identifying new/previously un-
known CSA media on P2P networks is considered pro-
active police work using live digital forensics.
3.2. Analysing Big Forensic Data
Big Data is defined by [29] as “high-volume, high-
velocity and high-variety information assets that de-
mand cost-effective, innovative forms of information
processing for enhanced insight and decision making”.
With regard to digital forensics, the increasing volume
of digital forensic evidence significantly contributes to
lengthy backlogs of cases within computer crime units
and forensic laboratories [30, 31]. For a wide range
of investigations, including P2P network investigations
2More specifically, this could mean that the offence has not oc-
curred yet or the offence is still unknown to the police.
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pertaining to CSA media, there is a need to focus the
process of digital forensic data collection and analysis
(cf. Section 2). Recently, a number of methods have
been suggested to address these big digital forensic data,
including data reduction [32], data mining [33], artifi-
cial intelligence [34] and triage [35, 36]. With respect to
digital forensics, triage3 involves a fast analysis of dig-
ital intelligence in order to provide investigative leads
that are ranked based on importance or urgency to be
acted upon, while maintaining its integrity and preserv-
ing it for an extended analysis using a forensic model in
the next phase of the investigation [37, 30, 28].
Our approach accumulates insights and techniques
from the fields of text categorisation and image classifi-
cation (both AI) into a forensic triage model, allowing
P2P investigators to (1) detect victims at acute risk, (2)
assign degrees of importance and urgency to items of
evidence in order to assess offenders’ potential danger
to society and (3) find useful evidence in a timely man-
ner.
3.3. Text and Image Classification
In text/image classification studies, the task consists
of automatically sorting documents (e.g. newspaper ar-
ticles, books, e-mails, etc.) or images and videos into
pre-defined classes or categories (e.g. different genres,
topics, etc.) based on their textual/visual content. In
current research, the dominant approach to these prob-
lems is based on machine learning techniques, in which
an inductive process automatically builds a classifier by
learning the characteristics of the individual categories
from a set of training documents/images. The trained
classifier can, then, distinguish between these categories
when it is confronted with new texts/images showing
similar characteristics.
Automatic text categorisation techniques are cur-
rently being used in many different contexts, ranging
from spam detection, indexing scientific publications
and the population of hierarchical catalogues of Inter-
net resources to finding relationships among biomedical
entities4. Image classification is mainly used for image
retrieval, i.e. detecting (or retrieving) images with a par-
ticular visual content in an image dataset.
3This term was adopted from the medical field were it refers to a
process for sorting injured people into groups based on their need for
immediate medical treatment when only limited medical resources are
available.
4An overview of text categorisation techniques and applications
can be found in, e.g. [70] and [71].
4. Related Work
4.1. Detecting CSA Media in P2P networks
As detecting known CSA media is relatively straight-
forward when a hash-value database is available, initial
work in this area mainly focused on the ability to dis-
rupt on-line child exploitation (e.g. [38]), reliability is-
sues regarding mutable identifiers, such as IP addresses
and GUIDs (e.g. [15, 39, 40]) and the identification of
key sharers (e.g. [41]). This has already resulted in a
number of forensic tools, such as CPS and RoundUp,
that can not only monitor such paedophile activities in
P2P networks, but also provide additional features such
as geolocation capabilities and centralised databases to
assist law enforcement in their international struggle
against on-line child exploitation. Moreover, Internet
companies such as Google and Microsoft have created
software, such as PhotoDNA, that enables law enforce-
ment to detect modified versions of known CSA media5
(see also [43, 44]). However, none of these tools offers
support for identifying new/previously unknown child
abuse media.
So far, only few attempt have been made to address
this issue. The authors of [45] demonstrated that col-
laborative filtering techniques that are typically used in
recommender systems, can be successfully applied to
identify new media in P2P networks of a certain cate-
gory (e.g. pornography, piracy software, popular mu-
sic). Their method is based on the assumption that file-
sharing traffic tends to cluster around interest, especially
when it involves illegal content, such as CSA media.
Hence, they were able to detect previously unknown
examples from these categories without analysing their
contents or filenames. Secondly, the MAPAP project [6]
specifically targets peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.
There, modelling of user activity and identification of
CSA-related keywords is utilised to identify child abuse
media. However, the first system was not tested on ver-
ified CSA data and the latter was not evaluated for the
scenario of identifying new/previously unseen CSA me-
dia.
4.2. Filename Categorisation
Although recent work has tackled the problem of de-
tecting deception [46], masquerading behaviour [47]
and identifying paedophile grooming activities [48] on-
line by combining natural language analysis with ma-
chine learning, these studies all operated on larger bod-
ies of text (e.g. chat room conversations). Contrary
5A comparative analysis of currently used methods for detecting
child abuse media on-line can be found in [42].
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to these studies, our work involved much shorter text
fragments, which also included a range of non-standard
and/or multi-language forms that are designed by of-
fenders to mask their shared files’ illegal content (cf.
Section 5). While a number of studies have focused on
textual features that are related to web-accessible im-
ages (e.g. [49, 50, 51]), they do not address any of these
additional challenges.
So far, there are only two studies – to our knowl-
edge – that used language analysis techniques to iden-
tify CSA media. As we mentioned before, the authors
of [6] investigated the feasibility to automatically con-
struct lists of CSA-related keywords. Therefore, in Sec-
tion 6.1 we start by evaluating their keyword-based ap-
proach on a new dataset containing verified CSA-related
filenames. The second study [52] examined whether
techniques used for SMS normalisation (cf. [53]) could
also be used to circumvent the issue of language varia-
tion or noise in CSA filenames. Because their work on
pornographic versus non-pornographic filename classi-
fication showed very promising results, in Section 6.1
we also evaluate our approach on this experimental set-
up.
4.3. Image and Video Classification
In recent years, quite some work on detecting pornog-
raphy in images and videos has been published. Most of
these studies focus on the utilisation of skin based fea-
tures (e.g. [54], [55] and [56]) or bag-of-visual-word
features (e.g. [57]). These techniques can also be ap-
plied to video data by drawing key-frames from the
video stream and extracting image features like colour
histograms and skin features (e.g. [58]) or skin area
shapes (e.g. [59]). For video data, prior research also
incorporated acoustic features, such as MFCCs [60] or
so-called audio words [61], which entails an analogue
approach to the visual words technique, based on vec-
tor quantised audio features. Furthermore, motion fea-
tures, such as motion histograms [62] and the autocorre-
lation of motion signals [63], have been considered for
pornography detection as well.
However, only few studies have investigated the fea-
sibility to identify CSA data based on visual features
(e.g. [64]). The authors of [65] utilise skin detection
in combination with filename analysis and a hash-based
detection method. Another quite common approach,
especially in forensics, is searching for visually simi-
lar image media in an index of already known images
as presented in [66] and [67]. By applying a query-
by-example technique, visually similar or identical im-
ages with respect to the given query can be retrieved.
Such functionality has shown to be suitable for find-
ing images that originate from known series or loca-
tions. However, similarity retrieval and hash-based ap-
proaches appear not directly suitable for detecting new
or previously unknown media files, because both tech-
niques require the availability of (similar) media files to
be indexed or hashed. This in turn renders these files as
already known. Instead, hash techniques can be utilized
to filter known CSA media prior to running the detec-
tion module, while similarity retrieval allows determin-
ing known instances after performing CSA detection.
5. Approach
In this section, we present the key components of the
iCOP toolkit, that is, the filename categorisation module
and the media classification module. The architecture
of the toolkit itself and its triage model is discussed in
Section 7. For both modules, we designed the following
scenarios that were triggered by practical aspects of law
enforcement investigations: (1) detection of CSA ver-
sus regular media (world) and (2) distinguishing CSA
from legal pornographic media (adult). As CSA me-
dia content can be considered a subclass of pornogra-
phy, the second scenario was expected to be much more
challenging. We evaluate both classification modules in
Section 6.
5.1. Filename Categorisation
Building a filename categorisation module that is suf-
ficiently robust so it can be employed by an automatic
environment such as the iCOP toolkit is a difficult task
for a variety of reasons. First, for a machine learn-
ing algorithm to be effective in identifying candidate
CSA media based on textual features in their filename,
it needs to be trained with both CSA and non-CSA file-
names. However, there are no CSA datasets publicly
available and crawling for CSA files directly from a P2P
network to acquire training data is illegal. Hence, we
could only use CSA-related filenames that were pro-
vided to us by law enforcement6. Secondly, the task
typically involves a great number of very short text sam-
ples, which inevitably leads to highly sparse data (i.e.
with both a huge number of instances and features, but
only few features per instance). A third challenge lies
within the class imbalance inherent to the task: in a P2P
environment, the number of non-CSA media that are
being shared highly predominates the number of CSA
6These filenames were mainly collected by researchers from evi-
dence in closed court cases.
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files. As most machine learning algorithms are designed
to optimise the overall accuracy rate, they have been
shown to have difficulty identifying documents of the
minority class (see e.g. [72]). Finally, sharers of CSA
media tend to create a specialised vocabulary, contain-
ing a whole variety of multilingual keywords, abbre-
viations and acronyms (e.g. “kinderficker”, “kdqual-
ity”, “ptsc”) to circumvent detection by law enforce-
ment, while maintaining their availability to other of-
fenders. This poses great difficulties for automated de-
tection techniques – especially because this vocabulary
also proved to be dynamic, i.e. it evolves as exist-
ing keywords come to the attention of P2P investiga-
tors (cf. [6, 52]). Moreover, supporting multiple lan-
guages typically requires sophisticated language identi-
fication/translation techniques. In this section, we dis-
cuss our approach to address these challenges.
5.1.1. Dataset
Prior research on the Gnutella network [11] reported
that 1.6 out of every 1,000 files matched with known
CSA media. Hence, to create a good reflection of re-
ality, for the filename categorisation module, we also
adopted a highly skewed data distribution during the
learning experiments. More specifically, we matched
10,000 csa filenames with 1,000,000 regular filenames
from the Gnutella network for the world class and
1,000,000 filenames that were linked to legal pornogra-
phy media that were taken from PicHunter, PornoHub,
RedTube and Xvideos7 for the adult class. As men-
tioned earlier, most filenames are very short, containing
only 41.6 characters on average (SD = 23.4).
5.1.2. Feature types
As we mentioned before, distributors of CSA media
tend to use multilingual, specialised vocabulary and in-
clude spelling variations together with other noise in
their filenames to avoid (automatic) detection of their
shared files, while making them widely searchable for
other offenders. Because the presence of such “se-
cret keywords” (e.g. “lolita”, “childlover”, “kdqual-
ity”, “ptsc”) in a filename is highly informative, we
first created a dictionary-based filter containing a man-
ually extended version of the CSA-related keyword lists
from the MAPAP project [6]. We refer to these as our
CSA Keyword features. We further extended this fil-
ter with forms of explicit language use (e.g. “hand-
job”), expressions relating to children (e.g. “kiddie”)
7www.pichunter.com, www.porno-hub.com, www.redtube.com,
www.xvideos.com
and family relations (e.g. “daughter”) in English, Ger-
man, Dutch, French, Italian and Japanese. Together,
these three categories, i.e. the explicit language, the
child references and the family references, form our Se-
mantic features. Hence, a filename without any CSA-
related keywords can still become a high-value target
with regard to CSA media when it contains, for exam-
ple, both explicit language use and references to chil-
dren (e.g. “handjob11yo”). We show an example of the
feature construction in Table 1. The presence of the key-
word “pt” (preteen) results in a hit for the CSA keyword
features, while “12yo” (12 years old) is identified as a
reference to a child.
While prior work [6, 52] mainly focused on automat-
ically identifying and/or normalising typical keywords
that are used by Internet child sex offenders to cam-
ouflage their files’ illegal content, in this study we ap-
ply a more comprehensive approach by combining our
dictionary-based filter we described above with other
linguistic information. More specifically, we first ex-
tracted all patterns of two, three and four consecutive
characters from the filenames (also called character n-
gram features). As can be seen from the example in
Table 1, this approach allowed us to circumvent the is-
sue of alternative keyword spellings: although the ac-
tual keyword “lolita” is not present in the example file-
name, the presence of the “lita” feature could be equally
discriminative when training the classifier, because that
feature is also present in filenames that do contain the
original keyword. Additionally, other potential cues
could be picked up by the model, even when they are
related to a new/unknown keyword or produced in a lan-
guage that is not included in our filter.
Table 1: Example of a CSA filename after feature engineering
Original filename ptl0lita12yo.jpeg
CSA-rel. keywords pt CSA keyword
Semantic feats. 12yo child ref
2-gram feats. pt tl l0 0l li it ta a1 12 2y yo
3-gram feats. ptl tl0 l0l 0li lit ita ta1 a12 12y 2yo
4-gram feats. ptl0 tl0l l0li 0lit lita ita1 ta12 a12y 12yo
5.2. Media Classification
Automatic assessment whether new or previously un-
known candidate media files actually contain represen-
tations of child sexual abuse requires a content-based
analysis of images and videos. This aspect arises from
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the fact that traditional hash-based assessment of me-
dia files relies on lists of known media files and, hence,
is not suitable for detecting unknown media. Further-
more, file hashes like MD5 or S HA1 can easily be cir-
cumvented by small alterations to the media file, such as
cropping, scaling, colour adoptions or format transcod-
ing. A further technique to hide CSA content is to em-
bed them into other regular images or videos. For all
these cases, methods utilising hashes can be expected to
fail.
Considering the advances in automatic concept de-
tection that have been achieved in recent years, tech-
niques from the field of computer vision can provide
the required capability to detect unknown CSA media
content. For this, feature representations of media files
are presented to a classifier which generates a model of
the concept. The classifier model hereby represents an
abstraction of the content appearance representing the
concept, as described via feature information. Depend-
ing on the complexity of concepts learnt, classifiers can
detect appearances of the trained concept in previously
unseen media files with good accuracies. However, de-
tecting CSA scenes in digital media remains a challeng-
ing problem due to its complex appearance and strong
variability. Some work on detecting adult pornography
has been published in the past, utilising mostly features
that describe the visible presence of human skin (see
Section 4.3). Though it appears reasonable to apply the
techniques for adult pornography detection to CSA me-
dia as well, the few attempts being made (e.g. [64]) sug-
gest that these known methods do not achieve compa-
rable detection accuracies. This might arise from an in-
sufficient description of CSA content appearance, which
possibly can be overcome by using multi-modal feature
representations. Additionally, for detecting CSA me-
dia in a real world scenario, as imposed by a P2P net-
work, the frequent occurrence of legal pornography in-
creases the challenge even further for the following rea-
son: adult pornography and CSA depict subclasses of
a pornography base class that have a very similar ap-
pearance. Moreover, borders between these subclasses
are often fluent and even experienced human investi-
gators sometimes are unable to decide correctly. As a
result, feature descriptions that are discriminative for
the pornography base class typically lack discrimination
ability when used for differentiating the subclasses. In
the following, our approach to the challenging task of
CSA detection in real world scenarios is presented.
5.2.1. Dataset
Processing both images and videos, our content clas-
sification module contains two input streams: (a) im-
ages, being fed into the feature extraction pipeline di-
rectly, and (b) video files, that are pre-processed by ex-
tracting video frames and a continuous audio stream.
All three classes, i.e. the CSA, world and adult
class, were represented by 20, 000 images and 1, 000
short videos each. The non-CSA data were collected
from various web sources like flickr.com, youtube.com,
pichunter.com, redtube.com, and pornhub.com. Numer-
ical feature representations for instances of CSA me-
dia were provided by European law enforcement. For
frame extraction, the input videos are split into shots of
100 frames. The centre frame of each of these video
segments is taken as a representative keyframe for ex-
traction of visual features. Additionally, audio features
are computed for all 4s segments, respectively.
5.2.2. Feature types
So far, the few studies that have investigated the feasi-
bility to identify CSA data were based on visual features
[64], RGB based skin detection in conjunction with file-
name analysis and a hash-based detection method [65]
or searched for visually similar image media in an in-
dex of already known images [66, 67]. Contrary to
these previous works, our approach combines content
describing visual and acoustic features, instead of using
them in isolation. This has already shown promising re-
sults for pornography detection in e.g. [69]. Moreover,
instead of using only a single visual modality, we com-
bine a range of various visual and non-visual features
for detecting CSA content. More specifically, for de-
scribing the visual content of images and video frames
we extract: (i) colour-correlograms, (ii) skin features,
(iii) visual words and visual pyramids. The audio infor-
mation of video files, if available, is described by com-
puting (iv) vector quantised MFCC features or Audio
Words. A brief description of the utilised feature ex-
tractions is presented next:
i Colour-Correlograms describe the occurrence
probability of a colour in a pixel’s neighbourhood
(see e.g. [73, 74, 75, 76]). Hence, they represent
the local spatial correlation of colours in images.
Here, we apply a special variant of the colour-
correlogram, namely the auto-colour-correlogram,
which describes the probability of the identical
colour c reoccurring within a distance d of the cur-
rent pixel in image I.
αdc (I) = γ
d
c,c(I)
For an improved performance, this feature is com-
puted in HSV colour space ([74]).
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ii The Skin-Feature is based on a RGB skin colour
model, which was generated using manually seg-
mented images from the COMPAQ database. The
presence of skin is indicated via a skin-probability-
map (SPM) (see also [55]).
P(skin|c) = Pskin(c)/(Pskin(c) + Pnon−skin(c))
For computing the skin feature, first the SPM is
transferred into a skin-segmentation-mask (SSM)
via morphological operations and adaptive thresh-
olding. Next, the mean intensities of SPM and
SSM are calculated, as well as their centre and
variance of skin mass. This yields a 14 dimen-
sional descriptor representing appearance proper-
ties of skin.
iii Because colour features – especially skin features
– are not very robust towards illumination changes,
we also computed Visual Words and Pyramids to
provide a texture based content representation. Vi-
sual words features are computed by scaling the
given image to 250 × 250 and extracting patches
of 8 × 8 using a regular sampling with a step size
of 5 pixels. Next, the DCT coefficients of the
YUV transformed patches are computed for each
channel. The final feature is represented by 36
low frequency coefficients from the Y-channel and
21 taken from U and V, respectively. Our visual
pyramid features are based on the same represen-
tation and are structured according to [77]. Apply-
ing 2, 000 entry codebooks for vector quantisation
yields the final representation of both features.
iv The audio stream of video files is described by ex-
tracting Audio Words, using the widely used Mel
Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [78]. We
extract MFCCs in steps of 8ms, using a 16ms slid-
ing window. Next, a frequency histogram is com-
puted from the Fourier transform of the signal.
For reflecting human acoustic perception, the fre-
quency histogram is weighted by the logarithmic
Mel scale. Finally, the weighted histograms are
DCT encoded, leading to a 13 dimensional descrip-
tor, which are vector quantised using a 1, 000 entry
codebook.
6. Experiments and Results
6.1. Filename Categorisation
To obtain a reliable estimation of the classifier’s
performance, we applied ten-fold cross validation (cf.
[79]). In this experimental regime, the available data
is randomised and divided into ten equally sized folds
or partitions. Subsequently, each partition is used nine
times in training and once in test. To enable a com-
parative analysis between the different scenarios we
described in Section 5, we first compiled a complete
dataset containing all 2,010,000 filenames and subse-
quently created ten training and test partitions. This
way, we could vary our training data according to each
scenario, but evaluate on the same test data, which still
contained all three classes (i.e. csa, adult and world).
Next, for each training partition we set up four differ-
ent learning experiments: (1) csa vs. world, in which
the adult filenames were removed; (2) csa vs. adult,
where we discarded the world data; (3) csa vs. mixed, in
which 50% of both non-CSA classes were omitted, and
(4) csa vs. adult vs. world, where we reused the data
of the third experiment, but set up a three-way classifi-
cation experiment. Hence, the CSA/non-CSA ratio (i.e.
10,000:1,000,000) in each experiment was maintained.
Additionally, we performed these experiments a second
time, balancing our dataset in each training partition but
maintaining the original skewed datasets in the test par-
titions. Finally, to enable a valid comparison to previous
work in this area [52], we also set up a balanced learn-
ing experiment in which we included only the adult and
world classes.
For classification, we compared the performance of
Support Vector Machines (SVM) to Naive Bayes (NB)
and Logistic Regression (LR). During the SVM learn-
ing experiments, the C parameter was experimentally
determined on a development set of each training par-
tition. Because our preliminary experiments showed
that a linear kernel was most suitable for dealing with
the large, sparse filename dataset, which is in line with
[82, 83, 84], we used a linear kernel during the experi-
ments. Additionally, we applied l2-normalisation on the
feature values for faster linear SVM training (cf. [81]).
Finally, the scores we report are average precision, re-
call and F-score. These are standard evaluation metrics
that can be computed based on the number of true pos-
itives (tp), true negatives (tn), false positives (fp) and
false negatives (fn) in a confusion matrix. The recall
score for each class provides information on the number
of filenames that were successfully retrieved, while the
precision score takes into account all retrieved filenames
for each class and evaluates how many of them were ac-
tually relevant. The F-score is then the harmonic mean















The results in Table 2 show that the Support Vector
Machines and the Logistic Regression algorithm both
significantly outperform the Naive Bayes classifier. Be-
cause the SVM model achieved the best F-score for
identifying CSA-related filenames, SVM’s were used
for the remaining learning experiments. To compare
our approach of including additional (noisy) linguis-
tic information to the work of [52] who attempted to
normalise the non-standard language varieties in each
filename, we set up a balanced learning experiment in
which the classifier was trained to automatically distin-
guish between the world and the adult class. Com-
bining character n-gram features with the Semantic fea-
tures we described in Section 5.1.2 resulted in a slightly
higher accuracy score of 99.3%8 and a 99.4% precision,
a 99.1% recall and a 99.3% F-score for the adult class.
However, as expected, identifying CSA-related file-
names proved to be much more challenging. Although
when training on the CSA-related keyword features (cf.
Section 5.1.2) the classifier achieved a very high preci-
sion score of 93.6%, it also yielded a very low recall and
F-score of 6.9% and 12.9%, respectively. In practice,
this would mean that out of 10,000 of our verified CSA-
related filenames, 9,310 would remain undetected when
using the keyword-based approach that was suggested
by [6]. Therefore, in a next series of experiments we
included our Semantic features and character n-grams.
Combining all features resulted in a significantly higher
recall score of 43.1% and a 55.8% F-score, but also led
to a decrease of the precision to 79.9%. As a result, out
of 5,175 predicted CSA-related filenames 932 would be
labelled as false positives by law enforcement in the
framework of a real-life investigation. The results of
these experiments are shown in Table 3.
With regard to the different training set-ups, the best
precision score was achieved when including all three
categories in training. Reducing the adult and world
categories to non-CSA increased the recall to 57.6%,
but decreased the precision to 56.9%, which resulted in
a slightly higher F-score of 57.2%. This decrease in pre-
cision could be explained by the fact that two disparate
8The authors of [52] reported a best accuracy score of 97.7% for
detecting adult pornography filenames.
classes (adult and world) were combined into a sin-
gle category. As can be seen in Table 4, the two other
learning experiments both produced high recall scores,
but low precision and F-scores. Balancing our dataset
in each training partition, while maintaining a skewed
dataset in the test partitions, led to a significantly higher
recall score of 80,8%, but the precision and F-score both
decreased to 13.7% and 23.7%, respectively.
Table 2: Results of the filename classification experiments using dif-
ferent machine learning algorithms
Scores (%) CSA Non-CSA
Prec. Rec. F-sc. Prec. Rec. F-sc.
Naive Bayes 62.3 5.7 10.4 99.2 99.9 99.6
Support Vector Machines 79.7 43.1 55.8 99.5 99.9 99.7
Logistic Regression 83.0 37.6 51.7 99.4 99.2 99.3
Table 3: Results of the filename classification experiments using dif-
ferent feature types
Scores (%) CSA Non-CSA
Prec. Rec. F-sc. Prec. Rec. F-sc.
CSA-rel. keywords 93.6 6.9 12.9 99.2 99.9 99.6
Semantic feats. 25.6 2.4 4.4 99.2 99.8 99.6
Char. n-grams 79.2 41.9 54.9 99.5 99.9 99.7
Combined 79.7 43.1 55.8 99.5 99.9 99.7
Table 4: Results of the filename classification experiments using dif-
ferent training set-ups. The set-ups marked with (*) were balanced in
training.
Scores (%) CSA Non-CSA
Prec. Rec. F-sc. Prec. Rec. F-sc.
CSA vs. world 2.0 60.1 3.9 99.5 74.8 85.4
CSA vs. adult 18.2 76.6 29.4 99.8 97.0 98.4
CSA vs. mixed 56.9 57.5 57.2 99.6 99.6 99.6
CSA vs. adult vs.
world
79.7 43.1 55.8 99.5 99.9 99.7
*CSA vs. world 2.6 86.5 5.12 99.8 72.5 84.0
*CSA vs. adult 5.5 87.5 10.4 99.9 87.0 93.0
*CSA vs. mixed 10.0 85.7 17.9 99.9 93.3 96.5
*CSA vs. adult vs.
world
15.0 80.5 25.3 99.1 94.4 96.7
6.2. Media Classification
During the experiments, we first extracted all feature
types we described in Section 5.2.2 from the data, fol-
lowed by a selection of 1, 500 training and 3, 000 test
samples. Because the filename classifier already filters
relevant content, during these experiments, we repre-
sented positive and negative classes in equal amounts
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(see also [? ]). Next, all extracted features f were pre-
sented to separate statistical classifiers. For classifica-
tion, we also used SVM’s, as they have shown supe-
rior performance compared to other options (e.g. [69]).
For estimating the C parameter, we performed a 5-fold
cross validation. Once again, our preliminary experi-
ments showed that a linear kernel was most suitable for
the task. Finally, the scores of the individual classi-
fiers were combined using a weighted sum late fusion
scheme, yielding a multi-modal classification score for




w f · P f (CS A|X)
The weights w f for late fusing the trained classifiers
were found by grid searching possible classifier com-
binations. Averaging the performance of all 5 folds
provided the numerical results of the experiments, pre-
sented in terms of average precision (AP) and equal
error rates (EER). As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6,
our classifiers reach average precision in excess of 92%
(image) and 95% (video) when compared with adult
pornography.
Table 5: Late fusion weights w f and classification results (single and
fused) for CSA detection in images.
CSA vs world CSA vs adult
Feature w f AVP EER w f AVP EER
ccorrelogram 0.6 92.9 14.0 0.7 91.1 16.8
vispyramids 0.4 91.4 16.1 0.4 87.4 20.6
skin segment 0.1 81.3 26.4 0.0 74.2 33.6
fused 94.7 11.7 92.1 15.5
Table 6: Late fusion weights w f and classification results (single and
fused) for CSA detection in videos.
CSA vs world CSA vs adult
Feature w f AVP EER w f AVP EER
audiowords 0.4 88.3 16.2 0.5 90.2 15.3
ccorrelogram 0.3 90.2 14.0 0.4 86.1 16.1
vispyramids 0.2 89.9 14.1 0.2 82.0 19.4
viswords 0.1 90.4 13.8 0.0 79.4 20.5
fused 97.3 7.5 95.7 8.2
6.3. Results for CSA Media Detection
The predominant method that investigators use to
discover CSA content in P2P networks is a matching
of candidate files with known material based on file
hashes9. Additionally, 70% of our law enforcement ex-
perts claimed to use lists of CSA-related keywords and
996% of our survey participants claimed to use this method.
abbreviations in their investigations10. Other informa-
tion sources, like the image content, were less common.
In this section, we showed that it is feasible to de-
sign an intelligent filtering module that can automat-
ically distinguish between CSA-related filenames and
other P2P material (including adult pornography) while
maintaining the complex conditions of a P2P scenario –
a large, highly skewed, sparse dataset. Although this ap-
proach significantly outperforms the standard keyword-
based approach, a false positive rate of 20.3% indicates
that a decision from the filename classification mod-
ule is still insufficient to label a candidate file as CSA-
related media. Hence, a highly precise image classifica-
tion module is required as a second step in the analysis.
When combined, our system was able to further reduce
this false positive rate to 7.9% for images and 4.3% for
videos.
In the next two sections, we discuss the iCOP
toolkit’s architecture and we present the results of a user
trial.
7. The iCOP Toolkit
The filename and image classification approaches are
synthesised in the iCOP toolkit to identify and priori-
tise new/previously unknown CSA media. As shown in
Figure 1, the toolkit has two major components: the P2P
Engine and the iCOP Analysis Engine.
Figure 1: Overview of the iCOP toolkit
The P2P engine provides functionality to monitor
public traffic on Gnutella, but other monitors can be
10In 53% of cases, these were official lists distributed by organisa-
tions like InHope, Interpol, IWF, FBI, ICE, CPS and in the other cases
self-created lists.
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plugged into the engine as well. The monitor extracts
information such as IP addresses, filenames and hash
values of files, together with meta data, such as when
a particular peer was last seen sharing a file. The lat-
ter is essential to identify the originator of a file af-
ter it has been labelled by the toolkit as containing
new/previously unknown CSA content. This informa-
tion is passed on to the iCOP analysis engine, which
undertakes the following steps:
1. It compares the hash values of files to a list of
known hashes. As we mentioned above, such
hash value lists are established by law enforcement
when CSA media are seized. This filtering mech-
anism ensures that the system disregards known
CSA media. Although the user interface does indi-
cate when a peer is sharing known CSA media, the
toolkit does not download or process the files given
the focus on identifying new/previously unknown
CSA media. This significantly reduces both stor-
age and computation requirements. We currently
use a file of SHA1 hashes in base-32 (one hash per
line), because this is the most common format in
which law enforcement store hash values for CSA
media. As a result, the design enables law enforce-
ment officers using the toolkit to plug in their own
hash value lists without substantial effort to import
them into a specific format or database.
2. The names of files that do not occur in the known
hash list are then passed on to the filename clas-
sifier for identifying their likelihood of containing
CSA media. This is the first step of the automatic
CSA media analysis. Filenames that are deemed to
be non-CSA media are discarded.
3. Files that are flagged by the filename classifier as
potentially containing CSA media are passed back
to the P2P engine for downloading. The down-
loaded files are then piped back to the iCOP anal-
ysis engine and are analysed by the media classi-
fier –the second step of the automatic CSA media
analysis– to determine if the content indeed con-
tains child abuse images.
The results of the analysis are stored in real-time in
the database. An investigator can login to the GUI to ac-
cess the iCOP “dashboard”, which automatically triages
the results to flag the most pertinent candidates for CSA
media as the highest priority. More specifically, the
main table displays details of the connections sharing
the greatest number of suspected files based on the re-
sults of the image analysis module. The table can also
be sorted according to total number of shared files, num-
ber of suspicious filenames, or number of shared files
known to be CSA media. Additionally, the user can
view thumbnails as well as the full media files to ver-
ify whether the flagged items are indeed CSA media.
If so, these items can be marked “confirmed” by the
user and are fed back into the hash database so that they
are considered to be known child abuse media in future
searches.
Furthermore, the toolkit GUI is designed around a
list of connections, which maps closely to the way P2P
software works. A connection is defined as:
connection = IP address + Port + GUID
Each connection is assumed to be a single user shar-
ing a given set of files from a specific location. This is
in contrast with an IP address alone, which could po-
tentially be shared by multiple users (e.g. several ma-
chines in a home) or a GUID alone, which could po-
tentially be used from different locations (e.g. work,
home, travel). The toolkit can display files shared by a
particular IP or a particular GUID. Hence, an investiga-
tor can easily view which connections are related via a
common IP address or GUID. As mentioned above, the
most pertinent candidates are flagged to the user as high
priority via the dashboard. Given legal constraints gov-
erning law enforcement, the toolkit’s modules can also
be integrated separately into extant investigative work-
flows and/or configured to focus on particular geoloca-
tions (e.g. a particular country or region). Additionally,
the system provides a demo mode to allow for testing
and debugging it using dummy P2P network data and
legal pornography. This is because any monitoring and
downloading of CSA media can only take place at suit-
able law enforcement premises.
Finally, in order to accommodate the requirements for
the development of victim-centric approaches in juris-
dictions that are restricted by statutory proscriptions on
the enactment of pro-active surveillance strategies (cf.
Section 2), the toolkit was developed in accordance with
a modular design that permitted flexibility in any oper-
ational application of the iCOP toolkit. This configura-
tion enabled domain law enforcement to deploy iCOP
as an integrated solution alongside existing P2P tools
in proactive monitoring contexts, or to adapt its media
or filename classifiers to the identification of new CSA
media during reactive investigative activities (e.g. in-
corporating iCOP’s component classifiers into triage in-
vestigation procedures during post hoc forensic exami-
nations of seized hardware).
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8. User Evaluation
To acquire more insight into the toolkit’s usability,
we conducted a live testing workshop with 9 law en-
forcement officers engaged in CSA investigations on
P2P networks from 7 different law enforcement agen-
cies across Europe. Given the legal (as well as ethical)
issues pertaining to such a live exercise, the two day
workshop was conducted on law enforcement premises.
The participants were provided background information
on the toolkit as well as details of how the analysis is
performed by the backend. They were provided train-
ing in the use of the user interface followed by actual
use of the toolkit on live data. A lot of usability feed-
back was gathered in focus-group style discussions and
used to improve the functionality and the user interface
subsequently. At the end of the workshop, a question-
naire was completed by the participants. Each question
was answered according to a 7-point Likert scale (1 -
strongly disagree ... 7 - strongly agree) and had room
for comments. The questions were as follows:
1. The toolkit has all the capabilities I need to priori-
tise investigations.
2. I believe the toolkit can facilitate my investiga-
tions.
3. I believe the toolkit will allow me to more effi-
ciently carry out investigations.
4. I believe the toolkit will assist me in efficiently
analysing the large number of files shared on P2P
networks.
5. I would frequently use this toolkit as part of my
investigations.
6. Overall, I believe the toolkit to be a valuable aid to
law enforcement.
The results are summarised in Table 7 where Q is the
question and P the participant. Participant 8 was a con-
sistent outlier in terms of low scores11. Participant 9
emphasised that he found problems in the user interface
rather than the available features. Particularly notewor-
thy is the positive feedback for facilitation of investiga-
tions (Q2), and value for law enforcement (Q6).
11This participant chose to give low scores because s/he did not find
any files that prompted him/her to launch an investigation during the
short workshop
Table 7: Survey results
Part. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
1 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.0
2 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.0
3 4.5 6.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 7.0
4 4.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 5.0 4.0
5 6.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
6 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 7.0
7 6.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 5.0 7.0
8 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
9 3.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 5.0
9. Conclusion
The increasing amount of CSA media being shared
across borders and with apparent impunity leads to new
children being found on-line every day. Each of these
children, often from within the family circle of the of-
fender, is a victim of child sexual abuse. Whether
charged with enforcing the law in respect of broader of-
fences of possession and distribution, or with the appre-
hension of producers of child abuse media, the identifi-
cation of contact sexual abuse and abuse victims were
cited as paramount concerns for P2P investigators. This
finding resonates with earlier observations that a pri-
mary goal of P2P investigations is to catch child abusers
and help children that are being sexually victimised,
rather than simply detecting and confiscating images
in the context of possession offences [14, 15]. How-
ever noble, these objectives are difficult, nigh impossi-
ble to realise using state-of-the-art tools such as CPS
and RoundUp. Such tools, which identify suspects in-
volved in the exchange of known CSA files, yield many
potential targets for law enforcement but offer little sup-
port for the identification and prioritisation of high-
risk targets – such as those distributing new/previously
unknown CSA media that may indicate recent or on-
going child abuse. In this paper, we presented the iCOP
toolkit: a forensic software package that is designed to
highlight sharers of new/previously unknown child sex-
ual abuse media in P2P networks. Additionally, it offers
secondary features, such as showing sharers of known
CSA files and allowing police investigators to see other
files shared by the same computer or other IP addresses
used by the same P2P client. Hence, the software allows
P2P investigators to more rapidly locate the producers
of such content and the victims therein. Moreover, its
14
modular design enables law enforcement agencies to in-
tegrate (parts of) the toolkit into their extant investiga-
tive workflows or to add new extensions for other types
of P2P clients and networks. The software is currently
being made available to law enforcement. Interested
parties should contact the authors for more information.
Although the current realisation of both the filename
and the image classification modules already provide
very high results, they could be further optimised. First,
the classification of images is still limited by operat-
ing only on low-level visual features. Future research
can potentially address this in multiple ways. While
CSA video classification can be significantly improved
by additionally using other modalities, i.e. audio or
motion information, image classification could be ex-
tended by utilising high-level visual features. For ex-
ample, the novel SentiBank feature [85], which consists
1, 200 classifier scores indicating the presence of pre-
trained concepts, could achieve some orthogonality to-
wards low-level descriptions in feature space, because
they build up on different information sources. Another
challenge for future research is the age verification of
individuals appearing in questioned images and videos.
Though evaluations have been conducted during the de-
velopment of the media classification module, current
approaches to determine the age of persons for support-
ing the classification decision cannot provide the robust-
ness that is needed in an automated environment such as
the iCOP toolkit. Also, the filename classification mod-
ule could be further enhanced by analysing and retrain-
ing on previously unknown filenames that were identi-
fied by the toolkit and labelled as true positives by police
investigators.
Furthermore, the same techniques for monitoring and
analysing filenames and file content we propose for the
Gnutella network could also be applied to other file
sharing systems, such as eDonkey and Bittorrent. Mon-
itoring these networks, however, will require different
software libraries for each protocol and may yield dif-
ferent types of information that require slightly different
database structures. In addition, some protocols rely on
central servers and will need to be manually configured
to monitor the servers of interest. Finally, quite a few
networks are designed to provide anonymity and pre-
vent freeloading. These issues will provide a further
venue for our future work.
Acknowledgment
This work was funded by the European Commis-
sion Safer Internet Programme project (SI-2010-TP-
2601002), iCOP: Identifying and Catching Originators
in Peer-to-Peer Networks, and by the Antwerp Univer-
sity, DAPHNE: Defending Against Paedophiles in Het-
erogeneous Network Environments. The authors would
also like to thank all law enforcement agencies that have
contributed to this project. Finally, special thanks go out
to Interpol. Without their efforts, our research would
have been impossible.
References
[1] D. Middleton, “Internet Sex Offenders”, Ch. 12 in Assessment
and Treatment of Sex Offenders: A Handbook, 2009.
[2] E. Quayle, G. Holland, C. Linehan, M. Taylor, “The Internet
and Offending Behaviour: A Case Study”, Journal of Sexual
Aggression, vol. 6, pp. 78-96, 2000.
[3] A. Cooper, “Sexuality and the Internet: Surfing into the New
Millenium”, Cyberpsychology and Behavior, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
187-193, 1998.
[4] D. Hughes, P. Rayson, J. Walkerdine, K. Lee, P. Greenwood,
A. Rashid, C. May-Chahal, M. Brennan, “Supporting Law En-
forcement in Digital Communities through Natural Language
Analysis”, In Proceedings of the International Workshop on
Computational Forensics, 2008.
[5] D. Hughes, J. Walkerdine, G. Coulson, S. Gibson, “Is Deviant
Behaviour the Norm on P2P File-Sharing Networks?”, IEEE
Distributed Systems Online, vol. 7, no. 2, 2006.
[6] M. Latapy, C. Magnien, R. Fournier, “Quantifying paedophile
activity in a large P2P system”, Information Processing and
Management, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 248-263, 2013.
[7] J. Prichard, P. Watters, C. Spiranovic. “Internet subcultures and
pathways to the use of child pornography”, Computer Law and
Security Review, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 585-600, 2011.
[8] D. Menasche, A. Rocha, B. Li, D. Towsley, A. Venkataramani.
“Content availability and bundling in swarming systems”, In
Proc. ACM CoNext, pp. 121-132, 2009.
[9] D. Stutzbach, R. Rejaie. “Understanding churn in peer-to-peer
networks”. In Proc. ACM IMC, pp. 189-202, 2006.
[10] K. Gummadi, R. Dunn, S. Saroiu, S. Gribble, H. Levy, J. Za-
horjan. “Measurement, modeling and analysis of a peer-to-peer
file-sharing workload”, SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., vol. 37, pp.
314-329, 2003.
[11] R. Hurley, S. Prusty, H. Soroush, R. Walls, “Measurement and
Analysis of Child Pornography Trafficking on P2P Networks”,
In Proceedings of the International world Wide Web Conference,
Brazil, 2013.
[12] J. Wolak, D. Finkelhor, K. Mitchell, “Child-Pornography Pos-
sessors Arrested in Internet-Related Crimes: Findings From the
NJOV Study”, Technical report, National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, 2005.
[13] Child Protection System. P2P Monitoring software developed at
TLO, http://www.tlo.com/, USA.
[14] M. Liberatore, R. Erdely, T. Kerle, B. Levine, C. Shields,
“Forensic Investigation of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks”,
In Proceedings of the DFRWS Annual Digital Forensics Re-
search Conference, 2010.
[15] M. Liberatore, B. Levine, C. Shields, “Strengthening forensic
investigations of child pornography on P2P networks”, In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Conference on emerging Networking EX-
periments and Technologies (CoNEXT), 2010.
[16] A. Irons, H. Lallie, “Digital Forensics to Intelligent Forensics”,
Future Internet, vol. 6, pp. 584-596, 2014.
[17] U.S. Department of Justice, “The National Strategy for
Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to
15
Congress”, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, USA,
2010.
[18] J. Wolak, D. Finkelhor, K. Mitchell, “Trends in Arrests for Child
Pornography Possession: The Third National Juvenile On-
line Victimization Study (NJOV-3)”, Technical Report, Crimes
against Children Research Center, University of New Hamp-
shire, Durham, USA, 2012.
[19] M. Tremblay, “The key informant technique: A non-
ethnographic application”, in R. Burgess (ed.), Field Research:
A Sourcebook and Field Manual, Routledge, 2003.
[20] V. Braun, V. Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology”,
Qualitative research in psychology, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 77-101,
2006.
[21] J. Benzecri, L. Bellier, “L?analyse des donnees”, In Vol 1: La
Taxinomie, 1973.
[22] Interpol, “Victim Identification”, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Crimes-against-children/Victim-identification, 2014 (Last
accessed August, 2014).
[23] G. Holland, “Identifying Victims of Child Abuse Images: An
Analysis of Successful Identifications”, in E. Quayle, M. Taylor
(eds.), Viewing Child Pornography on the Internet: Understand-
ing the Offence, Managing the Offender, Helping the Victims,
Russel House Publishing, 2005.
[24] M. Taylor, E. Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime,
Brunner-Routledge, 2003.
[25] M. McManus, M. Long, L. Alison, “Child Pornography Offend-
ers: Towards an evidence-based approach to prioritizing the in-
vestigation of indecent image offences”, In L. Alison, L. Rain-
bow (eds.), Professionalizing offender profiling: Forensic and
investigative psychology in practice, pp. 178-188, 2011.
[26] United States Secret Service, “Best practices for seizing elec-
tronic evidence”, Ed. 2, 2002.
[27] K. Jones, R. Bejtlich, C. Rose, “Real digital forensics: computer
security and incident response”, Addison-Wesley, 2006.
[28] T. Vidas, B. Kaplana, M. Geigerb, “OpenLV: Empowering in-
vestigators and first-responders in the digital forensics process”,
Digital Investigation, vol. 11, suppl. 1, pp. S45S53, 2014.
[29] Gartner. IT Glossary: Big Data. http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/big-data/. Accessed 16 May 2016.
[30] E. Casey, M. Ferraro, L. Nguyen, “Investigation delayed is jus-
tice denied: proposals for expediting forensic examinations of
digital evidence”, J Forensic Sci, vol. 54, pp. 13531364, 2009.
[31] M. Ferraro, A. Russell, “Current issues confronting well-
established computer-assisted child exploitation and computer
crime task forces”, Digital Investigation, vol.1, no.1, pp. 715,
2004.
[32] D. Quick, K. Choo, “Big forensic data reduction: digital foren-
sic images and electronic evidence”, Cluster Computing, pp. 1-
18, 2016.
[33] M. Kantardzic, “Data Mining: Concepts, Models, Methods, and
Algorithms”, Wiley, New York, 2011.
[34] F. Marturana, S. Tacconi, “A Machine Learning-based Triage
methodology for automated categorization of digital media”,
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital
Forensics & Incident Response, vol.10, no.2, pp. 193-204, 2013.
[35] S. Shiaeles, A. Chryssanthou, V. Katos, “On-scene triage open
source forensic tool chests: are they effective?”, Digital Investi-
gation, vol.10, no.2, pp. 99115, 2013.
[36] H. Parsonage, “Computer Forensics Case As-
sessment and Triagesome ideas for discussion”,
http://docplayer.net/10051888-Computer-forensics-case-
assessment-and-triage-some-ideas-for-discussion.html, Ac-
cessed 16 May 2016.
[37] M. Rogers, J. Goldman, R. Mislan, T. Wedge, S. Debrota,
“Computer forensics field triage process model”, In Proceed-
ings of the 2006 Conference on Digital Forensics Security and
Law, pp. 2740, 2006.
[38] K. Joffres, M. Bouchard, R. Frank, B. Westlake, “Strategies to
disrupt online child pornography networks”, Paper presented at
the European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference,
Athens, Greece, 2011.
[39] L. Dai, “An Ising-based approach for tracking illegal P2P con-
tent distributors”, Master thesis, Iowa State University, USA,
http://archives.ece.iastate.edu/archive/00000600/01/thesis.pdf,
2010. (last accessed in March, 2014)
[40] S. Yang, J. Kurose, B. Levine, “Disambiguation of residential
wired and wireless access in a forensic setting”, In Proceedings
of INFOCOM, pp. 360-364, 2013.
[41] B. Westlake, M. Bouchard, R. Frank, “Finding the key players
in online child exploitation networks”, Policy and Internet, vol.
3, no. 2, 1-32, 2011.
[42] B. Westlake, M. Bouchard, R. Frank, “Comparing methods for
detecting child exploitation content online”, In European Intel-
ligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC), pp. 156-
163, 2012.
[43] S. Baluja, “Building software tools to find child victims”,
http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2008/04/building-software-
tools-to-find-child.html, 2008. (last accessed in March, 2014)
[44] Microsoft, “New technology fights child porn by track-
ing its “PhotoDNA””, http://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/news/features/2009/dec09/12-15photodna.mspx, 2009.
(last accessed in March, 2014)
[45] M. Edwards, A. Rashid, “Collaborative Filtering as an Inves-
tigative Tool for Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Networks”, SCIENCE,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 67-79, 2012.
[46] S. Afroz, M. Brennan, R. Greenstadt, “Detecting Hoaxes,
Frauds, and Deception in Writing Style Online”, In Proceedings
of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 461-475,
2012.
[47] A. Rashid, A. Baron, P. Rayson, C. May-Chahal, P. Greenwood,
J. Walkerdine, “Who Am I? Analyzing Digital Personas in Cy-
bercrime Investigations”, IEEE Computer, vol. 46, no. 4, pp.
54-61, 2013.
[48] G. Inches, F. Crestani,“Overview of the International Sexual
Predator Identication Competition at PAN-2012”, In P. Forner, J.
Karlgren, and C. Womser-Hacker (eds.), CLEF 2012 Evaluation
Labs and Workshop Working Notes Papers, 2012.
[49] F. Wang, M. Kan, “NPIC: Hierarchical synthetic image classifi-
cation using image search and generic features”, In Proceedings
of the Conference on Image and Video Retrieval, pp. 473-482,
2006.
[50] W. Huang, W. Huang, C. Tan, W. Leow, “Model-based chart im-
age recognition”, In Proceedings of the International Workshop
on Graphics Recognition, pp. 87-99, 2003.
[51] E. Munson, Y. Tsymbalenko, “To search for images on the
web, look at the text, then look at the images”, In Proceedings
of the 1st international workshop on Web Document Analysis,
http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/ wda2001, 2001.
[52] A. Panchenko, R. Beaufort, C. Fairon, “Detection of Child Sex-
ual Abuse Media on P2P Networks: Normalization and Classi-
fication of Associated Ffilenames”. In Proceedings of Workshop
on Language Resources for Public Security Applications of the
8th International Conference on Language Resources and Eval-
uation (LREC), 2012.
[53] R. Beaufort, S. Roekhaut, L. Cougnon, C. Fairon, “A hybrid
rule/model-based finite-state framework for normalizing SMS
messages”, In Proceedings of ACL, pp. 770-779, 2010.
[54] H. Rowley, Y. Jing, S. Baluja. “Large Scale Image-Based adult-
Content Filtering”, Int. Conf. Comp. Vis. Theory and Applica-
tions, pp. 290-296, 2006.
16
[55] M. Jones, J. Rehg, “Statistical Color Models with Application
to Skin Detection”, Int. J. Comput. Vision, vol. 46, no. 1, pp.
81-96, 2002.
[56] M. Fleck, D. Forsyth, C. Bregler, “Finding Naked People”,
ECCV, pp. 593-602, 1996.
[57] T. Deselaers, L. Pimenidis, H. Ney, “Bag-of-Visual-Words Mod-
els for adult Image Classification and Filtering”, ICPR, pp. 1-4,
2008.
[58] H. Lee, S. Lee, T. Nam, “Implementation of high performance
objectionable video classification system”, ICACT, pp. 959-962,
2006.
[59] C. Kim, O. Kwon, W. Kim, S. Choi, “Automatic System for Fil-
tering Obscene Video”, In Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Advanced Communication Technology, pp. 1435-
1438, 2008.
[60] H. Zuo, O. Wu, W. Hu, B. Xu, “Recognition of Blue Movies by
Fusion of Audio and Video”, In Proc. of ICME, pp. 37-40, 2008.
[61] Y. Liu, X. Wang, Y. Zhang, S. Tang, “Fusing Audio-Words with
Visual Features for Pornographic Video Detection”, In Proceed-
ings of TRUSTCOM’11, pp. 1488-1493, 2011.
[62] C. Jansohn, A. Ulges, T. Breuel, “Detecting Pornographic Video
Content by Combining Image Features with Motion Informa-
tion”, ACM Multimedia, 2009.
[63] T. Xiaofeng, L. Duan, C. Xu, Q. Tian, L. Hanqing, J. Wang,
J. Jin, “Periodicity Detection of Local Motion”, IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Multimedia and Expo, pp. 650-653, 2005.
[64] A. Ulges, A. Stahl, “Automatic Detection of Child Pornography
using Color Visual Words”, In Proc. of the Int. Conf. Multimedia
and Expo, 2011.
[65] P. da Silva Eleuterio, M. de Castro Polastro, “An adaptive sam-
pling strategy for automatic detection of child pornographic
videos”, Int. Conf. on Forensic Computer Science, pp. 12-19,
2012.
[66] LTU Engine, available from
http://www.ltutech.com/en/products/ltu-engine-2 (retrieved:
June 2010).
[67] Netclean Analyze, available from http://www.netclean.com/ (re-
trieved: June 2010).
[68] A. Shupo, M. Martin, L. Rueda, A. Bulkan, Y. Chen, “Toward
efficient detection of child pornography in the network infras-
tructure“, IADIS International Journal on Computer Science
and Information Systems, 2006.
[69] A. Ulges, C. Schulze, D. Borth, A. Stahl, “Pornography de-
tection in video benefits (a lot) from a multi-modal approach”,
Workshop on Audio and Multimedia Methods for Large-Scale
Video Analysis, ACM, 2012.
[70] S. Weiss, N. Indurkhya, T. Zhang, F. Damerau, Text min-
ing: predictive methods for analyzing unstructured information,
Springer, 2010.
[71] F. Sebastiani, “Machine learning in automated text categoriza-
tion”, ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 34, pp. 1-47, 2002.
[72] C. Seiffert, T. Khoshgoftaar, J. Van Hulse, A. Folleco, “An em-
pirical study of the classification performance of learners on
imbalanced and noisy software quality data”, Information Sci-
ences, vol. 259, pp. 571-595, 2014.
[73] J. Huang, S. Kumar, M. Mitra, W Zhu, R. Zabih, “Image Index-
ing Using Color Correlograms”, CVPR, pp. 762-768, 1997.
[74] T. Ojala, M. Rautiainen, E. Matinmikko, M. Aittola. “Semantic
Image Retrieval with HSV Correlograms”, In Proceedings of the
12th Scandinavian Conference on Image Analysis, pp. 621-627,
2001.
[75] M. Rautiainen, T. Ojala, “Color Correlograms in Image and
Video Retrieval”, In Proceedings of the 10th Finnish Artificial
Intelligence Conference, pp. 203-212, 2002.
[76] Z. Zha, Y. Liu, T. Mei, X. Hua, “Video concept detection using
support vector machines - trecvid 2007 evaluations”, Technical
report, 2008.
[77] S. Lazebnik, C. Schmid, J. Ponce, “Beyond bags of features:
Spatial pyramid matching for recognizing natural scene cate-
gories”, IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vi-
sion and Pattern Recognition, vol. 2, pp 2169-2178, 2006.
[78] B. Logan, “Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients for Music
Modeling”, Int. Symposium on Music Inf. Retrieval, 2000.
[79] S. Weiss, C. Kulikowski, Computer Systems that Learn: clas-
sification and prediction methods from statistics, neural nets,
machine learning, and expert systems, Morgan Kaufmann: San
Mateo, USA, 1991.
[80] S. Maldonado, C. Montecinos, “Robust classification of imbal-
anced data using one-class and two-class SVM-based multiclas-
sifiers”, Intelligent Data Analysis, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 95-112,
2014.
[81] H. Yu, C. Ho, P. Arunachalam, M. Somaiya, C. Lin, “Product
Title Classification versus Text Classification”, Technical report,
2012.
[82] R. Fan, K. Chang, C. Hsieh, X. Wang, C. Lin, LIBLINEAR:
A Library for Large Linear Classification, IJournal of Machine
Learning Research, vol. 9, pp. 1871-1874, 2008.
[83] C. Hsieh, K. Chang, C. Lin, S. Keerthi, S. Sundararajan, “A dual
coordinate descent method for large-scale linear SVM”, In Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty Fifth International Conference on Ma-
chine Learning (ICML), pp.408-415, 2008.
[84] H. Yu, C. Ho, Y. Juan, C. Lin, “LibShortText: A Library
for Short-text Classification and Analysis”, Technical Report,
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/papers/libshorttext.pdf, 2013.
[85] H. He, Y. Ma (eds.), “Imbalanced Learning: Foundations, Algo-
rithms, and Applications”, John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
[86] D. Borth, R. Ji, T. Chen, T. Breuel, S. Chang, “Large-scale Vi-
sual Sentiment Ontology and Detectors Using Adjective Noun
Pairs”, ACM Multimedia, 2013.
17
